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Case No. 20100668-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
LONNYHIGH, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault in concert 
with two or more persons, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004), Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West Supp. 2009), 
and Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009); and riot, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of 
Defendant's gang affiliation under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
where such evidence was directly probative of the elements of the charged 
crimes, and did not constitute impermissible evidence of character? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. 
"[A] trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b)... [is 
reviewed for] an abuse of discretion " State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, | 
17, 256 P.3d 1102 (quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49,118,191 P.3d 17) 
(alterations in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The full text of each of the following rules is in the Addendum: 
Utah R. Evid. 401; 
Utah R. Evid. 402; 
Utah R. Evid. 403; 
Utah R. Evid. 404; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1 
Defendant, codefendant Saul Cristobal, and an unknown third man 
together attacked two brothers, Desidero and Emilio Maciel. Having 
encountered the brothers twice before on the Provo River Trail, the attackers 
waited until the third encounter to beat them repeatedly with a club and 
grapefruit-sized rock. 
Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, | 3,243 P.2d 
1250. 
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"I want a cigarette." 
Desidero Maciel and his friend Dakota were traveling by longboard 
along the Provo River Trail at night. R. 233:177-78. Defendant, codefendant 
Saul Cristobal, and an unknown third man ran to catch Dakota; Cristobal 
grabbed Dakota, pulling him off his longboard. Id. at 178,180,181. The 
cohorts surrounded Dakota, and Cristobal demanded a cigarette. Id. at 178, 
180. One of the men suggested leaving, but Cristobal insisted: "No, I want a 
cigarette/' Id. at 178; 180. Dakota offered to roll a cigarette for Cristobal, but 
discovered he had no rolling papers. Id. at 181. Desidero and Dakota then 
left. Id. at 181. The encounter lasted about three to four minutes. Id. at 180. 
"What you looking at?" 
Later that night, Desidero alone passed through the same area of the 
trail and again encountered the men who had previously accosted him and 
Dakota. Id. at 182. Desidero glanced at the group, and one of them said in a 
threatening tone, "What you looking at?" Id. at 182. Desidero sped away on 
his long board. Id. at 183. 
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"There might be trouble." 
Desidero called his brother Emilio Maciel, who was close by, and the 
brothers met to go home together. Id. at 130. Desidero told Emilio of his 
encounters with Defendant's band and said, "There might be trouble." Id. at 
130. Desidero suggested returning home by a different route but, not sensing 
the danger, Emilio insisted on returning along the trail. Id. at 131,133,158. 
As Desidero had expected, Defendant and his cohorts began following 
the brothers along the trail. Id. at 133-34. The third man crossed paths with 
Emilio, saying "What up Vato?" Id. at 155. This man whistled, apparently as 
some sort of signal to the other two. Id. at 149,155. In response, Defendant 
and Cristobal approached the third man and the brothers. Id. at 149. Emilio 
asked, "Why are you following us?" Id. at 134. Desidero stated, "You're the 
people that stopped me before." Id. When Cristobal threatened, "You better 
take your home boy home," the brothers agreed to leave. Id. at 134, 206. But 
as the brothers continued along the trail, the three men continued to follow. 
Id. at 134. Emilio told the men, "Don't follow us." Id. Desidero then said to 
Emilio that the group were "wannabe gangsters." Id. at 134; 188. 
Cristobal then picked up a grapefruit-sized rock, and looked as if he 
were going to throw it at Desidero. Id. at 135-36,159,185. But instead of 
throwing the rock, Cristobal and the third man "rushed" Desidero. Id. at 136, 
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185. A "split second" later, Defendant started throwing punches at Emilio. 
Id. at 136,160, 200. Emilio kneed and pushed Defendant aside to run to his 
brother's aid. Id. at 140. 
As Cristobal and the third man attacked Desidero, Desidero quickly 
fell to the ground and did not fight back. Id. at 187,188. The third man beat 
Desidero with a stick or club. Id. at 162,186-87. Cristobal hit Desidero in the 
head with the rock. Id. at 162,185-86,199. Cristobal and the third man then 
repeatedly beat Desidero with the stick and rock. Id. at 186. 
After Emilio broke free from Defendant, he pulled the third man off 
Desidero. Id. at 140. Desidero escaped from Cristobal and picked up his 
longboard to use for self-defense. Id. at 187. The third man hit Emilio in the 
head with the stick. Id. at 140. The three men then fled. Id. at 143, 200. As 
they fled, the men flashed gang signs and shouted "PVL." Id. at 143. Both 
brothers suffered head injuries. Id. at 144-46,186. 
Defendant and Cristobal each testified that they participated in the 
fight in self-defense. See generally R. 234:275-340. 
"It's just a gang." 
PVL is a street gang, whose name means " Provo Varrios Locotes," or 
as translated by Defendant, "Provo Neighborhood Crazies." Id. at 304, 305. 
Both Defendant and Cristobal admitted having been members of PVL. Id. at 
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299, 317. They both claimed, however, that Cristobal had cancelled his 
membership in the gang two or three months before the assault. Id. at 299, 
304,317. Defendant claimed that Cristobal did not "want to be affiliated with 
us. He didn't want no involvement in none of our activities." Id. at 305. 
Over Defendant's objections, the trial court allowed Defendant and 
Cristobal to be questioned about the nature of PVL. See, e.g., id. at 305-06. 
Defendant testified that PVL is "just a gang"; that PVL exists to do "graffiti 
and stuff"; that PVL has territorial boundaries in Provo; that PVL has 
"conflicts with rival gangs," meaning "fights"; and that "fighting and stuff" 
and a tendency to bravery and aggression raises one's status within the gang. 
Id. at306-07. 
Tne criminal case and 404(b) objection. 
Defendant and Cristobal were charged with two counts of aggravated 
assault in concert with two or more persons, each second degree felonies; riot, a 
third degree felony; and obstructing justice, a class A misdemeanor. R. 0001-3. 
Defendant and Cristobal were tried together. During trial, the State filed an 
amended information eliminating the obstruction charge. R. 0207-08. 
Before trial, Defendant filed a motion demanding disclosure of all rule 
404(b) evidence the State intended to introduce at trial. R. 0063. The State 
replied with a list of evidence it planned to introduce. R. 193-99. The State's list 
-6-
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indicated that it intended to show, among other things, that "Defendant is a self 
admitted member of and associated with" PVL and that "Defendant has PVL 
tattooed on his body." R. 199. 
In a discussion on the first day of trial regarding the rule 404(b) motion; 
the State noted that at the preliminary hearing, the victim testified that one or 
more of the assailants "were part of - I think he said TBU [sic] at the 
preliminary hearing." R. 233:5; see also R. 231:9-10. Because this evidence had 
already been heard at the preliminary hearing, the State argued that "evidence 
in relation to PVL is not even 404(b) evidence as it relates to this case, because 
there is evidence within the confines of this case that's not prior bad acts." R. 
233:5-6. The court responded, "Fve seen that." Ma t 6. The State asserted that 
"[o]bviously that evidence is relevant and important as it goes to things like 
motive," Id. at 6, but assured the court that the "State really is not trying... to. . 
. bring in a bunch of evidence about gang stuff that is going to be detrimental to 
the defendants." Id. at 6. Defense counsel then argued that any gang affiliation 
references should be prohibited. Id. at 9-10. 
The State addressed the court again, partially agreeing with defense 
counsel that it would be "impermissible for the State" to put on "expert 
testimony to establish what is PVL, what does it stand for." Id. at 11. However, 
the State argued that if the "defendants, themselves, take the stand . . . they 
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would open the door to those things." R. 233:12. The court ultimately 
determined that "at this stage" the gang evidence would not come in "unless 
[the defendants] do take the witness stand," but "the yelling of the slogan" and 
the wrist tattoo "comes in." Id. at 12-13. 
During its opening statement the State informed the jury that after the 
assault someone yelled back to the victims "that they were members or are 
associated with PVL." Id. at 113. After opening arguments, defense counsel 
pointed out to the court that the State referenced Defendant's association with 
PVL and reiterated that "what PVL means" would not be discussed unless one 
of the defendants testifies and "opens that door." Id. at 124. The State assured 
the court that it only intended to reference PVL in relation to the tattoo. Id. at 
125. However, the State also reiterated that information about PVL could be 
discussed if the defendants testified. Id. at 125. 
On the second day of trial, defense counsel informed the court that 
Defendant would testify. R. 234:256. Before Defendant took the stand, the court 
allowed each side to " discuss [] the sort of 404(b) issues et cetera," to ensure that 
all parties were "on common ground." Id. at 256. Defense counsel argued to the 
court that the issue should be analyzed, according to rule 609(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and that Defendant's prior convictions should not come in. Id. at 257-
58. The State then said, "I'm not sure I understand [defense counsel's] 
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argument in relation to 404(b), because the State's perspective is . . . that that 
whole ball game changes once they get on the stand." Id. at 265. The State 
continued, "[C]learly if [the defendants] get[] on the stand... it's fair game to be 
able to ask them are they members of PVL" and "to ask them a little bit about 
what is the nature of that organization/' Id. at 265. 
Defense counsel pressed further asking the court to delineate the 
allowable scope of the State's inquiries about PVL. Id. at 270. The court 
responded, "Well, how do I define that line?" Id, at 270. In an attempt to bring 
finality to the discussion, the court informed defense counsel that he could 
"object during the course of the inquiry" if he felt "that they have exceeded the 
bounds." Id. at 270. The court further clarified, "I think you can make an 
inquiry as it relates to what is PVL, and how long have you been associated with 
it, and . . . are they both members, do you know each other in connection with 
that." Id. at 273. 
During direct examination, defense counsel asked Defendant what 
happened after the assault. Id. at 298. Defendant replied, "I told him it's TVL'. 
. . It's a gang." Id. at 298. Defendant also admitted that he was a member of 
PVL, that he had a tattoo of "PVL" on his hand, and that Cristobal was a former 
member of the gang. Id. at 299. On cross examination, the State asked 
Defendant, "[T]his organization, PVL, what does it do; what is it about?" to 
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which Defendant answered, "A street gang/' Id. at 305. Defense counsel 
immediately objected and asked for a side bar. Id. at 305. After the side bar the 
State continued this line of questioning, asking whether the gang does "any 
charitable work/7 whether it was a "business enterprise/' and what the gang's 
purpose was. Id. at 306. Defendant responded that PVL exists to "[d]o graffiti 
and stuff," and to "have conflicts with rival gangs." Id. at 307-08. 
After both sides rested and the jury was excused, defense counsel 
requested permission to put his sidebar objection on the record. Id. at 358; see 
also id. at 399 (defense counsel requesting an ongoing objection on the record). 
Defense counsel argued that "the direction and the line and the intensity of the 
questioning had crossed the line from what was more probative than 
prejudicial, and it had become more prejudicial than probative." Id. at 359. The 
defense continued, "I recognize that this evidence of them being in the gang.. . 
has some limited probative value .. . that could have fit into the exceptions of 
Rule 404(b), but not that which goes into, again, what does this gang do? . . . 
This is not a gang case." Id. at 363, 364. Defense counsel requested a mistrial. 
Id. at360. 
The court reminded defense counsel that the defense's argument was that 
the defendants "didn't initiate anything, because they are not gang members." 
Id. at 365. The court explained, "I ruled that once the door is opened . . . there 
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can be some threshold inquiries as it relates to the organization itself." Id. at 366. 
The mistrial was ultimately denied because "the inquiries on the part of the 
State of Utah" did not go "beyond the direction of the court." Id. at 366-67. 
At the conclusion of trial, the State moved to dismiss one count of 
aggravated assault, to conform to the evidence presented. Id. at 353. The jury 
convicted Defendant and Cristobal of the two remaining charges — aggravated 
assault in concert with two or more persons, and riot. R. 227. Defendant was 
sentenced to one to fifteen years on the aggravated assault charge and zero to 
<•% 
five years on the riot charge. R. 222. Defendant timely appealed. R. 0228-29. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the trial court's discretionary ruling admitting 
evidence of his gang membership and the basic nature of the PVL gang. He 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence 
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, because the court failed to 
conduct a scrupulous examination of the evidence's admissibility. He further 
argues that the evidence was impermissibly offered to prove Defendant's 
character, and that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed 
the evidence's probative value. 
2
 Cristobal has also appealed. See case number 20100818-CA. 
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By its express terms, rule 404 applies only to evidence of character, not 
to evidence of one's affiliations. The challenged evidence does not constitute 
character evidence or evidence of other bad acts, and rule 404 therefore does 
not apply. 
Even if the evidence implicated rule 404, the trial court conducted a 
scrupulous examination of the evidence by considering Defendant's 
objections both before and after opening statements, and before and after the 
presentation of the challenged evidence itself. The trial court thus took full 
advantage of its privileged position to consider the evidence in context and 
its impact on the overall proceedings. 
Further, the evidence was offered for three proper non-character 1 
purposes: first, it was relevant to whether Defendant committed an assault 
in concert with two or more persons, an element of the charged offense; 
second, it rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense by explaining his 
possible motives for initiating the attack; and third, it aided the jury in 
i 
understanding the circumstances of the attack. 
Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. Rule 403 allows, but 
generally does not require, trial courts to exclude evidence if the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Because the 
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challenged evidence here has high probative value and a low risk of unfair 
prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
But even if the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the 
gang evidence, any error was harmless. Reversal is warranted only if, absent 
the evidence, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. 
Other record evidence, unchallenged on appeal, would have signalled 
Defendant's gang involvement to the jury, and the jury had sufficient other 
evidence of Defendant's guilt. Thus, Defendant has not shown that without 
the challenged evidence the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt. 
Without such a showing, any error in the trial court's evidentiary ruling is 
harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
RULE 404(b) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CHALLENGED 
GANG EVIDENCE, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SPEAKS 
NEITHER TO DEFENDANTS CHARACTER NOR TO 
OTHER BAD ACTS. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
evidence of Defendant's gang affiliations and evidence regarding the nature 
of PVL because such evidence constituted evidence of his character in 
violation of rule 404(b). See Br. Aplt. at 13. Although he has brought his 
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challenge primarily pursuant to rule 404(b), his challenge invokes rule 
404(a)'s prohibition of general character evidence as well. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, prohibits introduction of evidence 
' c 
regarding a defendant's character to prove that on a specific occasion he 
acted in conformity with that character. See Utah R. Evid. 404(a). The 
general prohibition against character evidence in rule 404(a) is given further 
expression by rule 404(b), which prohibits introducing evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs or acts . . . to show action in conformity therewith/' 
The gang evidence in this case does not implicate rule 404, because it is 
neither evidence of Defendant's general character under rule 404(a) nor 
evidence of other bad acts under rule 404(b). Rather, the gang evidence 
Defendant challenges merely addresses his affiliations and the purposes of-
those affliations. Rule 404 does not prohibit evidence of a defendant's 
affiliations, particularly where those affiliations are inextricably intertwined 
with the charged crime itself. 
A. Evidence of a defendant's affiliations does not constitute 
evidence of his character. 
Defendant claims that the evidence amounted to testimony "that 
[Defendant] had previously participated in gang fights as a member of PVL 
that were unrelated to the crimes charged." Br. Aplt. at 16. Defendant's 
claim misstates the record regarding the prosecutor's questions. With the 
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exception of one question, the prosecutor's questions related to the general 
nature of PVL and its corporate purposes and general activities. See R. 
234:306-309. Defendant testified that PVL is "just a gang;" that PVL exists to 
do "graffiti and stuff;" that PVL has territorial boundaries in Provo; that PVL 
has "conflicts with rival gangs," meaning "fights;" and that "fighting and 
stuff" and a tendency to bravery and aggression raises one's status within the 
gang. Mat306-07,309. 
The prosecutor thus focused his questions almost entirely on the 
nature of PVL and the fact that Defendant associated with PVL, not on 
Defendant's character or propensities. Character is the "aggregate of the 
3
 Defendant's brief also overstates the testimony regarding Defendant's 
participation in multiple gang fights. See Br. Aplt. at 13 ("High's 
participation in unrelated gang fights"); id. ("High's violent gang activities"); 
id. ("High's participation in unrelated gang fights"); id. at 16 ("High had 
previously participated in gang fights"); id. at 17 ("High's prior actions in 
unrelated gang fights"); id. at 18 ("High's unrelated, violent gang activities"); 
id. ("High's testimony regarding prior participation in unrelated gang 
fights"); id. ("High's participation in unrelated gang fights"); id. at 19 
("High's involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities"); id. ("High's 
participation in unrelated, violent gang activities"); id. ("evidence of High's 
involvement in unrelated, violent gang activities"); id. ("High's involvement 
in unrelated, violent gang activities"); id. at 20 ("High's participation in 
unrelated, violent gang activities"); id. at 21 ("High's unrelated, violent gang 
activities"). 
In fact, the prosecutor asked one very general question: "So you 
participated in that kind of similar activity before?" meaning graffiti, 
fighting, and territoriality, to which Defendant responded in the affirmative. 
R. 234:307. 
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moral qualities which belong to and distinguish an individual." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 232 (6th ed. 1990). Or stated otherwise, character is "the nature of 
a person, his disposition generally, or his disposition in respect to a particular 
trait such as peacefulness or truthfulness/7 1 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of 
Federal Evidence, 4th Ed., § 404.1 (West 1996). Rule 404(a) prohibits parties 
from making the argument that because a person has a general propensity 
for a particular behavior, that person likely committed a particular act in 
conformity with that propensity on a given occasion. See id/, Utah R. Evid. 
404(a). 
A person's affiliations do not define that person's moral qualities or 
general disposition. The prosecutor here did not ask the jury to infer 
Defendant's character from his affiliations. And, as demonstrated below, the 
gang evidence was relevant for several specific purposes, none of which 
included overall propensity for violence or aggressive behavior. Rather, this 
evidence suggested very specific relationships between the codefendants and 
Defendant's motives in committing the assault, which was directly relevant 
to whether Defendant acted in concert with his cohorts. Indeed, Defendant 
concedes that evidence of gang affiliation is admissible to prove collusion 
between the co-defendants, and even cites to case law admitting such 
evidence. See Br. Aplt. at 19 (citing United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700 (10th 
-16-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cir. 1999) (declining to consider gang evidence for rule 404 compliance 
because it was directly relevant to prove relationship between co-
conspirators)). His claim fails for this reason alone. 
Here, the challenged gang evidence does not run afoul of rule 404(a)'s 
general prohibition against asking the jury to infer Defendant's conduct from 
his general character or propensities. Instead, it proves Defendant's 
relationship with Cristobal, a fact critical to determining whether Defendant 
committed the assault in conjunction with others. The evidence thus does 
not constitute evidence of his character, and rule 404 does not apply. See 
Somee v. State, 187 P.3d 152,160 (Nev. 2008) ("Somee's admissions that he 
was affiliated with or was a member of the Horney Boyz were not evidence 
of a trait of character, but were admissions relevant to prove the charged 
crime."). 
Notably, Defendant does not argue that labeling him as a gang 
member would unfairly signal guilt by association in the minds of the jury. 
And for good reason. Even without the challenged evidence, the jury would 
have known that Defendant was a gang member based on the testimony that 
he and his cohorts yelled "PVL" and flashed gang signs as they fled the scene 
and that the three men attacked the victims after being mocked as "wannabe 
gangsters." Defendant testimony acknowleging that he was a gang member 
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In context of the prosecutor's overall questioning of Defendant, it 
becomes clear the prosecutor's questions established the nature and extent of 
Defendant's affiliation with PVL rather than establishing that Defendant 
engaged in fights or other bad acts. Had the prosecutor focused on other bad 
behavior by Defendant, that may have run afoul of rule 404(b). But the fact 
of Defendant's affiliation with PVL is not, in and of itself, a "crime[], wrong[] 
oract[]." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
While Defendant's gang affiliation may be a fact otherwise distasteful 
or offensive to a jury, he is not without protection for such a claim of unfair 
prejudice. See Utah R. Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of evidence if danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value; discussed more 
fully below). Rule 404(b), however, applies only to evidence of other bad 
acts, not other bad facts. "There are some aspects of the human condition 
that are not aptly captured by the phrase 'crimes, wrongs, or acts,' and these 
fall beyond the reach of [rule 404(b)]." 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:28 (3d ed. 2007). One's affiliation with a 
group, without more, could not fairly constitute a crime, wrong, or act. 
Notably, Defendant has cited no authority suggesting that one's affiliations, 
gang or otherwise, constitutes evidence of character or other bad acts. 
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C. Rule 404(b) does not apply to evidence of matters 'intrinsic' to 
the charged crime. 
Even if the evidence here could be properly characterized as evidence 
of "acts" — such as the "act" of belonging to a gang—such evidence is 
intrinsic to the charged crimes and are not "other" acts. Defendant's 
membership in PVL is analogous to involvement in a criminal conspiracy. 
"[E]vidence of acts committed pursuant to a conspiracy and offered to prove 
the defendant's membership or participation in the conspiracy are not 
extrinsic evidence," i.e., evidence of 'other' acts, for purposes of rule 404(b). 
United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420,1431 (5th Cir. 1995). See also 22 Charles 
Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 
5239, at 450 (1978). Rule 404(b) "only applies to evidence of acts extrinsic to 
the crime charged." Id. (citation omitted and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Other act evidence is intrinsic, and thus not excludable under 
Rule 404(b), when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the crime 
charged are inextricably intertwined .. .." Id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. 
Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 396 (7th ed. 1998) (stating if other bad 
acts evidence is inextricably intertwined with the charged crime, "there is no 
need to articulate a 'not-for-character' purpose for the evidence"). 
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Defendant's gang affiliation bears directly on the crime he committed. 
Defendant was charged with committing aggravated assault in concert with 
two or more persons in violation of Utah Code sections 76-5-103 (West Supp. 
2009) (aggravated assault) and 76-3-203.1 (providing enhanced penalties for 
committing assault in concert with two or more persons). Section -203.1 (2)(a) 
provides an enhanced penalty when "the person acted in concert with two or 
more persons/7 "In concert with two or more persons'7 under section 203.1 
means "the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons 
in committing the offense and was aware of this aid or encouragement." Id. 
at203.1(l)(b)(i). 
Section 203.1(2)(a) requires that the factfinder—in this case, the jury — 
determine whether Defendant acted in concert with two or more persons. 
And section 203.1(l)(b) requires the jury to make determinations regarding a 
defendant's awareness of the others aiding him. Thus, the gang evidence at 
issue here directly addresses the findings the jury was required to make 
under the enhancement provisions of section 203.1. 
Defendant and his cohorts belonged to PVL, a street gang whose 
purposes included street fighting, and whose members rewarded bravery 
and aggressive behavior. Further, this specific gang had on other occasions 
engaged in fighting rivals. This evidence makes it more likely that Defendant 
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committed this assault in concert with other members of his gang, and that 
he was aware that they all had the same purposes in fighting. Thus, 
Defendant's gang affiliation speaks to whether he acted in concert with 
others during the very fight in question, and that affiliation is "inextricably 
intertwined" with the charged crime. Wright & Graham, supra § 5239 at 450. 
Accordingly, rule 404(b) does not exclude Defendant's gang affiliation, as a 
circumstance of the crime itself, as an "other crime[], wrong[], or act[]." 
II. 
EVEN IF RULE 404 APPLIES, THE GANG EVIDENCE HERE 
WAS OFFERED FOR A RELEVANT, NON-CHARACTER 
PURPOSE AND DID NOT UNFAIRLY PREJUDICE 
DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues primarily that the trial court did not scrupulously 
examine the gang evidence under rule 404(b), thus requiring reversal on 
appeal. He secondarily argues that the evidence itself does not pass muster 
under rule 404(b). The trial court, however, did scrupulously examine the 
evidence, and this Court cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting it. 
Even if the trial court did not scrupulously examine the evidence 
under rule 404, such failure does not mandate reversal. Rather, the trial 
court's lack of scrutiny merely obliges this Court to grant less deference to 
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the trial court's decision to admit the evidence. The evidence was admissible, 
and this Court should affirm. 
A. The trial court scrupulously examined the evidence under rule 
404(b). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "in the proper exercise of [their] 
discretion, trial judges must 'scrupulously7 examine the [404(b)] evidence 
before it is admitted/7 State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, % 42, 28 R3d 1278 (citing 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, If 18, 993 P.2d 837). The trial court must conduct 
a three-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whether the evidence is 
offered for a proper, non-character purpose; second, the court must 
determine whether the evidence is relevant under rule 402; third, the court 
must determine whether, under rule 403, the potential for unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value. See State v. Nelson-
Wagoner, 2000 UT 59, Iff 18-20, 6 P.3d 1120. 
Defendant argues that the trial judge here did not scrupulously 
examine the evidence. See Br. Aplt. at 13-21. Defendant's arguments 
regarding the extent of the trial court's review of the evidence, however, 
seem to center on the trial court's conclusions about the evidence's 
admissibility, not the trial court's process for arriving at those conclusions. 
One may disagree with whether the evidence passes muster under rule 
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404(b), but that does not render the trial court's examination of the evidence 
less than scrupulous. 
Nevertheless, the trial judge here did engage in a scrupulous 
examination of the evidence at issue, and at multiple stages of the litigation. 
The parties argued the admissibility of the evidence on the morning of the 
first day of trial, both before and after opening statements, and again on the 
second day of trial, both before and after Defendant testified. Defendant 
moved for mistrial, and the trial court denied the motion. The trial court 
considered and discussed each of Defendant's arguments, and determined 
that the evidence related to a non-character purpose: the court reviewed 
Defendant's assertion that he "didn't initiate anything, because they are not 
gang members." R. 234:365. The court explained, "I ruled that once the door 
is opened . . . there can be some threshold inquiries as it relates to the 
organization itself." R. 234:366. Further, the trial court indicated the evidence 
was admissible to explore the relationship between the codefendants. Id. 
The mistrial was ultimately denied because "the inquiries on the part of the 
State of Utah" did not go "beyond the direction of the court." R. 234:366-67. 
Thus, the trial court considered both the non-character purpose of the 
evidence and its potential for unfair prejudice, even though it might not have 
recited extensive findings on the issue. See State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, 
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n.10,256 P.3d 1102 ("[B]ased on the evidence and argument before the trial 
court on this issue, it can be inferred that the trial court 'scrupulously 
examined' the relevant evidence."); State v. Harter, 2007 UT App 5, | 30,155 
P.3d 116 (noting trial court need not identify each admissibility factor to 
conduct proper examination of evidence). 
Further, Defendant conceded below, and concedes on appeal, that the 
evidence was relevant. See R. 234:363 ("I recognize that this evidence of them 
being in the gang . . . has some limited probative value "); Br. Apli at 19 
(conceding the evidence "was probative of the relationship between 
[Defendant] and Cristobal" and "of their alleged collusion"). Thus, each 
portion of the rule 404(b) analysis was either considered extensively by the 
trial court or conceded by Defendant. 
Based on the evidence and argument presented at trial, the trial court 
admitted the gang evidence Defendant now challenges. The arguments he 
raises on appeal are essentially the same arguments he made below, which 
the trial court rejected. The trial court scrupulously examined the evidence 
because it repeatedly considered Defendant's arguments before, during, and 
after presentation of the evidence, and under the appropriate 404(b) 
standards. Thus, the trial court acted within its considerable discretion in 
admitting the gang evidence. 
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B. Even if the trial court did not scrupulously examine the 
evidence, that failure only affects the standard of appellate 
review and does not mandate a finding of error or reversal on 
that basis alone. 
While trial courts have a duty to scrupulously examine the 
admissibility of bad acts evidence under rule 404(b), the proper exercise of 
that duty does not determine the ultimate admissibility of the evidence, nor 
does failure to scrupulously examine 404(b) evidence demand a finding of 
error or reversal on that basis alone. Rather, as discussed below, the 
scrupulous examination requirement defines the degree to which Utah 
appellate courts will scrutinize the trial court's discretionary decision to 
admit the challenged evidence. The more carefully a trial judge scrutinizes 
the evidence's relevance, non-character purpose, and potential for unfair 
prejudice within the context of the entire presentation of evidence to the jury, 
the more deference appellate courts will afford the trial judge's decision. 
However, where a trial court engages in a less careful examination of that 
evidence under the appropriate admissibility standards, appellate courts will 
themselves look more closely at the evidence to determine its admissibility 
and effect on the overall proceeding. To require reversal, the trial court must 
have both neglected its scrupulous examination duty and admitted improper, 
unfairly prejudicial character evidence that likely changed the outcome of the 
t r i a l . • • * 
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From the beginning of the "scrupulous examination7' standard 
appearing in Utah case law, it has constituted an appellate standard of 
review, not a standard for evidentiary admissibility. State v. Decorso marks 
the first time in Utah case law that the scrupulous exmination standard was 
fully set forth as a requirement for analyzing rule 404(b) evidence. See 1999 
UT 57, % 18,993 P.2d 837 (stating "admission of prior crimes evidence . . . 
must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of 
[their] discretion"). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the 
proper framework for reviewing a rule 404(b) claim on appeal after then-
recent amendments to the rule. See id. at t l12-13. The amendment at issue 
was intended to abandon the "very limited deference" standard of review 
previously adopted in State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484,489 (Utah 1997), 
superceded by statute in Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59. See Decorso, 1999 UT 57 
at % f 12-13. Relying on the amendment and the advisory committee notes to 
the new rule 404(b), the Decorso court concluded that the Doporto "very 
limited deference" standard of review was "too restrictive and require[d] 
modification." Id. at f 15. 
The Decorso court thus established a new standard of appellate review7 
in rule 404(b) cases, relying heavily on Justice Zimmerman's separate opinion 
in State v. Doporto. See id. If 16 (citing Doporto, 935 P.2d at 496 (Zimmerman, 
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J., concurring in part)). Justice Zimmerman recognized that "'the trial judge 
is the one primarily responsible for making the evaluation'" of whether rule 
404(b) evidence is admissible. Id. at 116 (citation omitted). He suggested 
that the "very limited deference" standard of appellate review established by 
the majority in Doporto "'had the effect of diminishing the relative 
importance of the trial court's judgment and enhancing that of the appellate 
court." Id. Justice Zimmerman concluded, and the Decorso court later 
agreed, that "'in order to avoid the conclusion that the trial court abused its 
discretion, all 'i's must be dotted and all 't's crossed.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
The Decorso court then clarified that "'abuse of discretion'" is the appropriate 
standard of review in rule 404(b) cases, and that trial judges must 
"scrupulously examine[]" that evidence "in the proper exercise of that 
discretion." Id. at ^ 18 (footnote omitted). The Decorso court never suggested 
that a trial court's failure to scrupulously examine such evidence was a basis, 
standing alone, for finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
admitting rule 404(b) evidence. Rather, it made clear that ultimately the test 
of whether rule 404(b) evidence was properly admitted depended on 
whether it was relevant to a proper, non-character purpose, and whether its 
potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. 
See id. 
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Thus, the scrupulous examination standard applicable to rule 404(b) 
evidence is an appellate standard of review, not a separate factor for 
admissibility under rule 404(b) itself, nor an independent ground for reversal 
in the event of a trial court's failure to scrupulously examine such evidence. 
In fact, the State has been unable to find any case where a Utah appellate 
court has reversed a trial court's admission of rule 404(b) evidence after 
finding that the trial court conducted a scrupulous examination under the 
appropriate evidentiary standards. This is because the trial court conducting 
such a review of the evidence expands the deference appellate courts will 
grant to the trial court's decision to admit the evidence. 
While it is true that Utah appellate courts have characterized trial 
courts' less than scrupulous examinations of rule 404(b) as abuse of 
discretion, see State v. Ferguson, 2011 UT App 77 Iff 18, 20,250 P.3d 89; State v. 
nildreth 2010 UT App 209, If 52, 238 P.3d 444 (McHugh, J., concurring), those 
court's findings of abuse of trial court discretion did not end the inquiry. In 
Ferguson, for example, after concluding that the trial court failed to 
scrupulously examine the challenged rule 404(b) evidence, this Court 
conducted its own review of the effect the evidence had on the overall 
proceedings, and determined that there was little likelihood of a different 
result had the trial court excluded the evidence. See Ferguson, 2011 UT App 
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77 at f t 19-20. The trial court's failure to scrupulously examine the rule 
404(b) evidence's effect on the overall proceedings thus triggered a closer 
review by this Court, but not reversal. See id. 
Judge McHugh's concurring opinion in State v. Hildreth offers further 
guidance on the effect of a trial court's failure to scrupulously examine rule 
404(b) evidence. See 2010 UT App 209, | 52 (McHugh, J., concurring). Judge 
McHugh noted that the trial court in that case had failed to scrupulously 
examine the challenged rule 404(b) evidence: "Thus, I undertake that 
analysis in tlte first instance on appeal to evaluate whether the error Itere was 
prejudicial" Id. (emphasis added). Judge McHugh thus determined that the 
trial judge's failure demanded that the appellate court conduct the 
scrupulous examination that the trial court did not. She then carefully and 
thoroughly examined the challenged evidence and its overall effect on the 
proceedings below, reaching an independent conclusion on whether the 
evidence was admissible under rule 404(b). See id. at f^ 56. The court of 
appeals reversed the trial court's admission of the rule 404(b) evidence, but 
that reversal was not founded on the trial court's failure to scrupulously 
examine the evidence; rather, that reversal was based on a closer appellate 
scrutiny of the evidence itself, and Judge McHugh's concurring opinion 
clearly articulated that process. See id. at \ \ 46, 56. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also reviewed admission 
of rule 404(b) evidence in this way. See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 
213 (5th Cir. 1983). In Robinson, the Fifth Circuit applied a requirement 
similar to Utah's scrupulous examination requirement. See id. That court 
stated that the analogous scrupulous examination standard does not require 
reversal where "the factors upon which the probative value/prejudice 
evaluation were made are readily apparent from the record, and there is no 
substantial uncertainty about the correctness of the ruling/' Id. See also 
Mueller et al, supra, § 4:29 (citing multiple cases where trial court's failure to 
render appropriate admissibility findings "does not lead to appellate 
disapproval" of admission of rule 404(b) evidence). 
Characterizing the scrupulous examination standard as a purely 
appellate review concern gives proper recognition to the fact that the trial 
judge's "'firsthand exposure to all the evidence and his familiarity with the 
course of the trial proceedings are the best qualifications available for 
evaluating the value of the evidence in its proper context.'" Doporto, 935 P.2d 
at 496-97 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted). Or, as 
Justice Zimmerman elsewhere stated, such deference properly allocates 
responsibility between trial and appellate courts due to their "distinct and 
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unchanging institutional competencies/7 State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 n.4 
(Utah 1994). 
Because the scrupulous examination standard constitutes a standard of 
appellate review, rather than a factor for admissibility under rule 404(b), then 
it follows that a trial court's failure to scrupulously exmine evidence will 
merely reduce the deference appellate courts should grant to the trial court's 
decision to admit the evidence. 
Thus, even if this Court determined that the trial court here failed to 
scrupulously examine the challenged gang evidence for compliance with rule 
404(b), it does not follow that it should reverse Defendant's conviction and 
remand for a new trial. Rather, this Court should then merely grant less 
deference to the trial court's decision regarding the evidence's admissibility 
and conduct a closer review of that evidence. As demonstrated below, a 
close review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the challenged gang 
evidence was properly admitted in accordance with rule 404(b). 
C The gang evidence was admissible under rule 404(b). 
Regardless of whether this Court defers to the trial court's discretion in 
admitting the evidence or conducts its own close review of the evidence's 
admissibility, the challenged evidence passes muster under rule 404(b) 
because it was offered for several relevant, non-character purposes, and it 
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was not the type of evidence to prompt the jury to decide the case on an 
improper basis. 
1. The gang evidence was offered to show Defendant's 
actions in concert with others, to explain the context of the 
crimes, and to rebut his claim of self-defense. These are 
proper, non-character purposes. 
In determining whether bad acts evidence is admissible, the trial court 
must determine whether the evidence is being offered for a proper, non-
character purpose, such as one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b). See 
Nelson-Wagoner, 2000 UT 59, f 18. Rule 404(b) specifically allows admission 
of bad acts evidence for proper, non-character purposes, such as "proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident/' Utah R. Evid. 404(b). This list is not 
exhaustive. See State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, t 28, 62 P.3d 444; State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366,369 (Utah 1996). 
Thus, rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion, which presumes 
"the admission of all relevant evidence except where the evidence has 'an 
unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury/" State 
v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, | 26,112 P.3d 1252 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201,1221-22 (Utah 1993)). See also State v. Olson, 869 P.2d 1004,1011 
(Utah App. 1994) (characterizing rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion). "Prior 
bad act evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being offered is 
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to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in conformity with that 
character/7 Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
In context of the issues before the jury, the gang evidence Defendant 
challenges was directly and highly relevant to prove facts other than his 
character. As stated, Defendant himself concedes that the evidence was 
relevant. See Br. Aplt. at 19. And the gang evidence was highly probative of 
non-character issues properly before the jury. See John E. Theuman, 
Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Accused's Membership in Gang, 39 
. A.L.R. 4th 775 (1985) (citing cases dealing with admissibility of gang 
evidence, and concluding that "[g]ang membership has frequently been 
found to be probative and admissible"). 
The gang evidence in this case had direct relevance to non-character 
issues for three reasons: first, it was relevant to prove Defendant acted in 
concert with two or more persons, an element of the charged offense; second, 
it rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense by explaining his possible 
motives for initiating the attack; and third, it aided the jury in understanding 
the circumstances of the attack. 
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a. The gang evidence was relevant to show Defendant 
acted in concert with two or more persons. 
First, as explained Defendant was charged with committing 
aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons in violation of Utah 
Code sections 76-5-103 (aggravated assault) and 76-3-203.1 (providing 
enhanced penalties for committing assault in concert with two or more 
persons). The jury had to determine whether Defendant acted in concert 
with two or more persons and whether he and his cohorts were aware of 
each other. Thus, the gang evidence at issue here directly addresses the 
findings the jury was required to make under the enhancement provisions of 
section 203.1. See also United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996,1007 (7th Cir. 
1997) ("Evidence of gang affiliation is admissible [under rule 403] in cases in 
which it is relevant to demonstrate the existence of a joint venture or 
conspiracy and a relationship among its members/'). As demonstrated 
above, the evidence Defendant complains of is directly and highly probative 
of the crimes he was charged with and the specific findings the jury had to 
render. 
b. The gang evidence was relevant to rebut Defendant's 
claim of self-defense by explaining other likely motives 
for the fight 
Second, Defendant raised a claim of self-defense at trial, alleging that 
the Maciel brothers started the fight. See, e.g., R. 234:321. The parties 
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presented mutually exclusive versions of how the fight began, and the jury 
was aided in deciding between those versions by knowing that Defendant 
and his compatriots belonged to a street gang that rewarded aggression and 
fighting. The gang evidence thus speaks to Defendant's motives in fighting: 
(1) he would be rewarded by status and approval from his friends by 
fighting; and (2) Desidero had insulted the gang members by calling them 
"wannabe gangsters," thereby giving them a reason to retaliate. Having a 
gang-related motive to fight makes it less likely that Defendant merely 
responded to the aggression of others, and more likely that he initiated the 
fight. See Milan v. State, 932 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding 
evidence of gang affiliation admissible to rebut defendant's self-defense 
claim); Utz v. Virginia, 505 S.E.2d 380,387 (Va. App. 1998) (same). Thus, 
Defendant's own claim of self-defense rendered his gang membership 
relevant to motive, a non-character purpose under rule 404(b). 
c. The gang evidence was relevant to explain the 
circumstances of the fight 
Finally, the gang evidence was relevant because the circumstance of 
the fight itself suggested gang activity, and the jury was entitled to know 
who and what PVL is. The fight began after Desidero called Defendant and 
his cohorts "wannabe gangsters," and ended with the men flashing gang 
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signs and shouting their gang name as they fled the scene.4 Thus the 
companions themselves linked their gang membership directly to the fight 
and wanted their gang status to be known. 
The parties could not have provided the jury a full and fair description 
of events without reference to PVL, and the evidence would have been 
confusing to the jury without at least a basic understanding of what PVL is. 
See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, H 24,25 P.3d 985 (admission of evidence of 
nicknames, chants, and dances provided background for charged crime and 
was therefore properly admitted); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1141 (Utah 
1989) (evidence admissible where relevant to "explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime"); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978) 
(where "evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the 
instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose"). 
In sum, the gang evidence in this case served multiple permissible 
purposes, and did so with force and probity. It aided the jury in determining 
the central and proper issues they had to consider, and the trial court thus 
acted well within its discretion in determining that the evidence served a 
non-character purpose under rule 404(b). 
4
 Defendant does not challenge the testimony that he and his 
companions flashed gang signs and shouted "PVL" as they fled. 
-37-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The evidence was relevant under rule 402. 
As explained, Defendant conceded the relevance of the gang evidence, 
both below and on appeal. See R. 234:363 ("I recognize that this evidence of 
them being in the gang. . . has some limited probative value . . . . ."); Br. Aplt. 
at 19 (conceding the evidence "was probative of the relationship between 
[Defendant] and Cristobal" and "of their alleged collusion"). Thus, no 
further discussion of relevance under rule 402 is necessary. 
3. The evidence's probative value far outweighs its danger of 
unfair prejudice. 
After determining that bad acts evidence is offered for a proper non-
character purpose and is relevant under rule 402, a trial court must finally 
determine whether the evidence is admissible under rule 403. See Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ^ 20. Under rule 403, the court "indulge[s] a 
presumption in favor of admissibility." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1222. "Rule 403 
does not require a trial court to dismiss all prejudicial evidence because all 
effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party 
against whom it is offered." Killpack, 2008 UT 49 at % 53 (quotations, citation, 
and alteration omitted). "Rather, the rule only requires that the trial court 
measure the danger the evidence poses of causing 'unfair prejudice7 to a 
defendant." Id. (emphasis in original). "'Unfair prejudice' within [the context 
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of rule 403] means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis . . . . " State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1989). 
A trial court acts within its discretion to exclude otherwise relevant 
evidence only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice/7 Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). "'Unfair 
prejudice7 within [the context of rule 403] means an undue tendency to 
suggest decision on an improper basis " State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1989). An improper basis is commonly but not necessarily an 
emotional one, "such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or 
horror." State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, \ 21,196 P.3d 124 (citation and 
quotations omitted), cert denied, 207 R3d 432 (2009). "Only when evidence 
poses a danger of 'rousting] the jury to overmastering hostility' does it reach 
the level of unfair prejudice that rule 403 is designed to prevent." Killpack, 
2008 UT 49 at f 53 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, % 29, 8 P.3d 1025). 
Stated another way, unfair "prejudicial evidence is any evidence that affects 
the trier of fact in a manner not attributable to the permissible probative force 
of the evidence." 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. 
Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 243 (7th ed. 1998). "[T]he term 
'unfair' emphasizes the point that evidence ought not to be excluded at the 
mere hint of risk . . . . " Mueller et al, supra, § 4:13. 
-39-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that evidence of 
gang membership that directly explains the crime at issue will necessarily 
cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. State v. Milligan is 
instructive. See 2010 UT App 152,2010 WL 2311852. That case stated in dicta 
that "there may be some unfair prejudice inherent in making the jury aware 
of gang affiliation/7 Id. at *2. But in that case, this Court affirmed admission 
of the gang evidence under rule 403 because the evidence was "high[ly] 
probative" and not "emphasized by the prosecutor" for irrelevant purposes. 
Id. The gang evidence in this case was likewise highly probative and not 
overly emphasized by the prosecutor, other than to show context. The 
challenged testimony is limited to fewer than three pages of transcript within 
the context of a two-day trial with over 400 pages of transcript. See R. 
172:306-08. 
Moreover, the prosecutor did not initiate the challenged line of 
questioning until after Defendant and codefendant Lonny High raised their 
claim of self-defense. See id. In fact, the prosecutor did not refer at all to 
Defendant's gang membership during his summation. See R. 172:371-77. 
The State thus confined its exploration of Defendant's gang membership to 
its proper and legitimate purposes and did not use the gang evidence to 
predispose the jury against Defendant in any improper way. 
-40-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thus, evidence of gang membership is admissible under rule 403 if it 
bears directly on the facts and circumstances of the crimes at issue. Where 
evidence of gang membership does not bear on the issues of a particular case, 
such evidence may certainly cause unfair prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., 
United States v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Evidence of gang 
membership can be inflammatory, with the danger being that it leads the jury 
to attach a propensity for committing crimes to defendants who are affiliated 
with gangs or that a jury's negative feelings toward gangs will influence its 
verdict....") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. 
Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We have consistently held that, under 
appropriate circumstances, gang evidence has probative value warranting its 
admission over claims of prejudice. However, we have also long recognized 
the substantial risk of unfair prejudice attached to gang affiliation evidence .. 
..") (citations omitted). Such is not the case here, and Defendant has not 
shown that the challenged evidence prompted the jury to convict him for any 
reason other than his guilt for the charged crimes. 
But even if Defendant had shown that the gang evidence had limited 
probative value and a significant risk of unfair prejudice, he has not shown 
that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by that risk. See Utah R. Evid. 403. 
-41-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The requisite balancing test necessarily rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an 
abuse of that discretion. See State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, Tj 18,222 
P.3d 768; State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, f 12, 95 P.3d 302. "We are 
confident that Trial Judges can identify the likely harm associated with 
probative evidence and can estimate its impact on the jury/' Saltzburg et al, 
supra, at 242. "Because Rule 403 provides that the negative factors set forth in 
the Rule must substantially outweigh the probative value, it follows that the 
discretionary power to exclude should rarely be used/' Id. at 259. Accord K-B 
Trucking Co. v. Riss InVl Corp., 763 F.2d 1148,1155 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The 
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to 
be used sparingly/7) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Defendant argues that the trial court "did not apply the Shickles 
factors," rendering its rule 403 analysis deficient. Br. Apit. at 18. State v. 
Shickles provides an illustrative list of some factors a court may consider in 
determining whether evidence passes muster under rule 403. See 760 P.2d 
291 (Utah 1988); see also Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at | 20 (citing Shickles 
with favor). The Shickles court stated that in conducting a rule 403 analysis, 
a variety of matters must be considered, including 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of 
the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, 
the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
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crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Shickles, 760 R2d at 295-96. 
However, Defendant's argument that the trial court failed to 
adequately consider the Shickles factors underscores the fact that the evidence 
here was not other bad acts evidence in the first place. Defendant did not 
describe any acts that could be compared with the assault that he committed 
here. The trial court could not compare any "similarities between the crimes" 
because no other crime was described, nor could it consider "the interval of 
time that has elapsed between the crimes" without a description of some 
other specific crime. Id. Without a description of some other bad act 
committed by Defendant, Shickles is inapposite to this case. 
Because there is little danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant, and that 
risk does not substantially outweigh the high probative value of the gang 
evidence, Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion 
by admitting the challenged evidence. 
III. 
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE WAS INADMISSIBLE UNDER 
RULE 404(b), ITS ADMISSION WAS HARMLESS 
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged 
gang evidence, that ruling was nevertheless harmless. An error is harmless 
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where there is "no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989); see also Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Stated otherwise, 
"[f]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must 
be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 
734 R2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant complains only of the prosecutor's introduction of evidence 
regarding the nature of PVL and Defendant's participation in PVL activities, 
Had the trial court excluded all the challenged evidence, the jury would have 
nevertheless heard testimony that Defendant responded to the third man's 
whistle, that the three cohorts attacked the Maciel brothers unprovoked, that 
Decidero considered Defendant and his friends to be "wannabe gangsters," 
and that Defendant and his friends flashed gang signs and shouted the name 
of a gang as they fled the scene of the crime. Thus, the challenged evidence 
was merely cumulative of other, unchallenged evidence of concerted gang 
activity by Defendant and his friends. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 
(Utah 1989) (finding harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence 
was cumulative of other testimony). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Utah R. Evid. 401. Definition Of "Relevant Evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
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Utah R. Evid. 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant 
Evidence Inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, 
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
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Utah R. Evid. Rule 403 Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of 
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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Utah R. Evid. 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions; Other Crimes 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered 
by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim of-
fered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, 
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible 
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in 
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a 
sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissi-
ble under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-202 (West Supp. 2009) Criminal responsibility for 
direct commission of offense or for conduct of another 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009) Offenses committed in 
concert with two or more persons — Notice — Enhanced penalties 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an 
enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or 
more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing 
the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the 
other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the 
same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he 
were an adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall 
cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the 
defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than five years 
in addition to the statutory minimum prison term for the offense, and which may 
be for life. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding 
drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1, Assault and 
Related Offenses; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, Criminal 
Homicide; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3, 
Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Smuggling; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
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(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property 
Destruction; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 2, Burglary and Criminal Trespass; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4, Theft, or Part 6, 
Retail Theft; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 
76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, 
Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 
76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 
76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3, Explosives; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 10, Part 12, Pornographic and Harmful Materials and Performances; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10/ Part 13, 
Prostitution; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and 
Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglar}7' of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the 
persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not 
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are 
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009) Riot-Penalties 
(1) A person is guilty of riot if: 
(a) simultaneously with two or more other persons he engages in tumultuous or 
violent conduct and thereby knowingly or recklessly creates a substantial risk of 
causing public alarm; or 
(b) he assembles with two or more other persons with the purpose of engaging, 
soon thereafter, in tumultuous or violent conduct, knowing, that two or more 
other persons in the assembly have the same purpose; or 
(c) he assembles with two or more other persons with the purpose of committing 
an offense against a person or property of another who he supposes to be guilty 
of a violation of law, believing that two or more other persons in the assembly 
have the same purpose. 
(2) Any person who refuses to comply with a lawful order to withdraw given to 
him immediately prior to, during, or immediately following a violation of 
Subsection (1) is guilty of riot. It is no defense to a prosecution under this 
Subsection (2) that withdrawal must take place over private property; provided, 
however, that no persons so withdrawing shall incur criminal or civil liability by 
virtue of acts reasonably necessary to accomplish the withdrawal. 
(3) Riot is a felony of the third degree if, in the course of and as a result of the 
conduct, any person suffers bodily injury, or substantial property damage, arson 
occurs or the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; otherwise it is a class B misdemeanor. 
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